“When agencies established to perform specialised national functions are converted into vehicles for constituency spending, institutional effectiveness inevitably declines”.
BY BELLO GWARZO ABDULLAHI
Nigeria is witnessing a dangerous form of budgetary vandalism—one that systematically hijacks the statutory mandates of public institutions and redirects them towards political patronage. Unless this trend is decisively reversed through constitutional discipline and institutional reforms, it will continue to weaken governance, erode accountability and undermine national development.
The recent Daily Trust editorial, “Rot in Constituency Projects,” goes to the heart of one of the most troubling weaknesses in Nigeria’s system of governance. The revelation that the 2026 Appropriation Act has transformed several federal agencies into vehicles for political patronage is not merely an administrative lapse; it represents a serious distortion of constitutional governance and public financial management. To be sure, many Nigerians have long raised concerns about the manner in which this abuse of the budget process has steadily expanded.
The question is: How did Nigeria arrive at a point where an agency established to tackle Almajiri and out-of-school education is funding road projects, while a space research institution is procuring sewing machines? These are not isolated cases of poor budgeting. They point to a deeper structural problem in which institutional mandates are routinely sacrificed to satisfy political interests. Understanding how this happened requires revisiting the original idea behind constituency projects, examining what the Constitution actually assigns to lawmakers, and identifying the reforms needed to restore discipline to the budget process.
Constituency projects, formally known as Zonal Intervention Projects (ZIPs), emerged shortly after the return to democratic rule in 1999. Their stated objective was noble: to ensure that federal resources reached communities that might otherwise be neglected by a highly centralised government. In principle, there was nothing wrong with seeking equitable distribution of development projects. The problem lies in how the initiative has evolved. There is no gainsaying the fact that the implementation of constituency projects has gradually eroded one of the most fundamental principles of Nigeria’s constitutional democracy—the separation of powers.
Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to make laws, while Section 81 authorises it to consider and approve the national budget. Section 5, however, clearly assigns the execution of those laws and budgets to the Executive through the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).
The distinction is straightforward. Legislators are expected to determine what should be funded; the Executive is responsible for deciding how approved projects are implemented in accordance with established procurement laws and administrative procedures.
Unfortunately, that constitutional boundary has increasingly been ignored. When legislators determine the precise locations of projects, influence contractor selection, or pressure MDAs to execute projects they neither conceived nor have the capacity to manage, they cease to perform legislative functions and begin to assume executive responsibilities. Although the Supreme Court has affirmed the National Assembly’s power to amend budget estimates, that authority was never intended to permit lawmakers to take over the day-to-day functions of executive agencies. This helps explain why so many constituency projects are poorly conceived, badly executed and ultimately fail to deliver value to the public.
Supporters of constituency projects often argue that legislators are closest to the people and therefore best positioned to identify local needs. They also maintain that lawmakers do not directly handle public funds since the money remains within the budgets of MDAs. That defence, however, becomes difficult to sustain when viewed against the realities highlighted by the Daily Trust editorial and similar concerns raised by many Nigerians.
Rather than routing projects through ministries equipped with the technical expertise and institutional capacity to execute them, lawmakers increasingly channel them through relatively small commissions, research institutes and specialised agencies that lack engineering departments, procurement capacity and project management structures. Such agencies are often chosen precisely because they are easier to influence and less capable of resisting political pressure. The consequences are profound.
When almost 92 per cent of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution’s budget is diverted to finance fertiliser distribution and street lighting, the institute is effectively prevented from pursuing its primary responsibility of promoting peace and conflict management in a country facing serious security challenges. It is a classic example of sacrificing national priorities for political expediency.
Similarly, when the National Commission for Almajiri and Out-of-School Children Education is compelled to finance road construction instead of educational interventions, the very children it was created to serve become the ultimate victims.
These examples illustrate not merely poor budgeting but the systematic abandonment of institutional mandates.
It is equally important to distinguish between legitimate legislative oversight and the current practice surrounding constituency projects.
Sections 88 and 89 of the Constitution empower the National Assembly to investigate government activities, expose corruption and ensure that public funds are properly utilised. Oversight is one of the legislature’s most important constitutional responsibilities because it promotes accountability after public funds have been appropriated and spent.
Constituency projects, however, invert that constitutional arrangement.
Instead of reviewing implementation after the fact, legislators increasingly influence project selection, determine implementing agencies and, in many instances, reportedly influence contractor appointments before procurement even begins. Once lawmakers become planners, implementers and indirect beneficiaries of projects they are later expected to oversee, meaningful accountability becomes virtually impossible. A committee cannot objectively investigate an agency when its members participated in shaping the very procurement decisions under review.
Reversing this trend requires courage, political will and meaningful institutional reforms.
First, the Executive must resist the gradual distortion of the budget process. The President should not assent to appropriation bills that substantially undermine the statutory mandates of federal agencies. Likewise, the Budget Office of the Federation should strengthen its internal review mechanisms to identify and reject budget insertions that clearly fall outside the legal responsibilities of affected MDAs before the Appropriation Bill is finalised.
Second, the Public Procurement Act must be enforced without compromise. The Bureau of Public Procurement, working alongside the ICPC and EFCC, should subject contracts executed through vulnerable commissions and specialised agencies to closer scrutiny. Equally important, heads of MDAs who resist unlawful political pressure should enjoy adequate legal protection. Any attempt to intimidate agency heads into awarding contracts contrary to due process should attract appropriate criminal sanctions.
Third, the Federal Government should finally implement the recommendations of the Oronsaye Report by merging or abolishing redundant agencies whose existence contributes little to national development while providing convenient channels for budget manipulation. A leaner and more focused public service would reduce opportunities for budget padding and institutional abuse.
Finally, Nigeria should gradually transition towards a more transparent, citizen-centred development financing model. If the objective is genuinely to improve rural communities, intervention funds should be administered through properly structured national or local development programmes where projects emerge from verified community needs, transparent planning processes and measurable development priorities—not from the personal preferences of individual politicians.
Nigeria cannot continue to operate a budgeting system in which public institutions are stripped of their mandates to accommodate political patronage.
When an agricultural research institute becomes a construction agency, food security suffers. When an education commission is compelled to build roads instead of educating vulnerable children, the nation’s future is compromised. When agencies established to perform specialised national functions are converted into vehicles for constituency spending, institutional effectiveness inevitably declines.
The Daily Trust editorial should therefore serve as a timely national warning. Both the Tinubu administration and the leadership of the National Assembly have a constitutional obligation to restore integrity to the budget process, respect the doctrine of separation of powers and allow public institutions to perform the responsibilities for which they were established.
Only then can Nigeria build institutions that serve the public interest rather than political convenience.
…Bello Gwarzo. Abdullahi, a political analyst based in Gombe can be reached via bgabdullahi@gmail.com
